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Uranium recovery can reduce the mass of waste and 
possibly the number of waste packages that require 
geologic disposal.  Separated uranium can be managed 
with the same method (near-surface burial) as used for 
the larger quantities of depleted uranium or recycled into 
new fuel.  Recycle of all transuranics reduces long-term 
environmental burden, reduces heat load to repositories, 
extracts more energy from the original uranium ore, and 
may have significant proliferation resistance and physical 
security advantages. 
Recovery of short-lived fission products cesium and 
strontium can allow them to decay to low-level waste in 
facilities tailored to that need, rather than geologic 
disposal.  This could also reduce the number and cost of 
waste packages requiring geologic disposal.  These 
savings are offset by costs for separation, recycle, and 
storage systems.  Recovery of technetium-99 and iodine-
129 can allow them to be sent to geologic disposal in 
improved waste forms.  Such separation avoids 
contamination of the other products (uranium) and waste 
(cesium-strontium) streams with long-lived radioisotopes 
so the material might be disposed as low-level waste. 
Transmutation of technetium and iodine is a possible 
future alternative. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper summarizes how the selection of elements 
to be recycled (which transuranics) impacts a broad range 
of recycle-related metrics.  The main goals of the 
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative are to:[1,2,3] 
? Recycle used nuclear fuel to minimize waste and 
control weapons-usable inventories. 
? Reuse valuable parts of used nuclear fuel to 
maximize the energy derived from uranium ore. 
? Enable the expansion of nuclear power while only 
requiring a single repository through the end of the 
century.
? Enable the global expansion of nuclear energy while 
also reducing proliferation risk and enhancing 
nuclear security. 
The AFCI addresses the needs associated with 
increasing the sustainability of nuclear energy.  First, the 
AFCI investigates fuel cycles that would convert current 
waste liabilities into energy source assets, helping ensure 
that availability of uranium ore resources does not 
become a constraint on the expansion of nuclear energy.  
Second, all of the AFCI fuel cycles would incorporate 
more proliferation-resistant technologies and designs than 
employed in current international practice, would reduce 
the inventory of weapons-usable material by consuming 
plutonium more quickly, and would reduce the need for 
uranium enrichment.  Third, AFCI is developing 
technologies that should allow in the future more efficient 
disposition of used fuel and high-level waste, helping to 
delay the need for additional geologic repositories into the 
next century.  While accomplishing these objectives, 
AFCI seeks to ensure competitive economics and 
maintain the excellent safety record for the entire nuclear 
fuel cycle. 
Which chemical elements should be recovered to 
achieve various potential objectives?  Section II explains 
that the original focus of recycling was energy recovery, 
which led to separation of plutonium and uranium only.  
Section III describes how the focus has changed to add 
waste management and proliferation risk management.  
Sections IV and V address fundamental properties of used 
nuclear fuel, radiotoxicity and heat generation, which 
impact long-term waste management in any country, 
independent of waste sites.  Section VI considers Yucca 
Mountain parameters as a specific example site to ensure 
that the site-independent analyses remain valid.  Section 
VI considers parameters that may influence economics 
and proliferation resistance. 
II. ORIGINAL FOCUS OF RECYCLING WAS 
ENERGY RECOVERY 
Figure 1 shows that about 95% of used nuclear fuel 
mass is useful material, uranium (94%) and the 
transuranic elements of neptunium, plutonium, 
americium, and curium (1%).  The other 5% of used fuel 
comprises fission products. 
Figure 2 shows that uranium and plutonium 
constitute 99.8% of the energy content in used fuel.  This 
is why current nuclear fuel recycling efforts in France, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, and Russia use separation 
technologies such as PUREX that only separate uranium 
and plutonium.  That is essentially all that is useful for 
energy recovery. 
Figure 1. Composition of used nuclear fuel at 50 MW-
day/kg burnup
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Figure 2. Energy content of used nuclear fuel at 50 MW-
day/kg burnup
These facts have been known for decades; recycling
used fuel for its energy content only requires recovery of
uranium and plutonium.  The plutonium is mostly fissile
and can be readily recycled in thermal or fast reactors; the
uranium is mostly fertile and best recycled in fast
reactors.  To use more of the energy content in the 
original uranium ore, the unused uranium and transuranic
elements in used fuel must be recovered.  Sustained
recycling is needed to substantially improve energy
recovery.
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III. NEW FOCUS
Trends in other industries suggest that recycling will 
continue to grow in acceptance, with better economics,
whereas waste disposal will continue to drop in 
acceptance, with worse economic and social costs.  The
U.S. census bureau statistics indicate that about a quarter
of municipal waste is now burned for energy and another
quarter is recovered for reuse.  Recycling can and should 
address constraints other than energy recovery, in
particular waste management. What can recycling of
used nuclear fuel do for waste management?
IV. SITE INDEPENDENT RADIOTOXICITY
To answer this question, it is necessary to look at the
composition of used nuclear fuel from other perspectives
than energy recovery.  Like other wastes, used nuclear
fuel is toxic, primarily because of radioactive isotopes.
Internationally, a common way to describe the hazard of 
used fuel is radiotoxicity, which is the inventory of 
radioisotopes divided by their relative hazard to humans.
Figure 3 shows the radiotoxicity of used nuclear fuel
relative to the uranium ore that started the process. It
remains more radiotoxic than uranium ore for about a
million years.  The “actinides” plotted in the figure
include uranium and transuranic elements.
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Figure 3. Radiotoxicity of used fuel relative to uranium ore. Actinides are uranium, transuranic elements, and their decay
products.  Sr+Cs is strontium and cesium.  Tc+I is technetium and iodine. Other long-lived elements include selenium,
palladium, tin, and antimony.  All other fission products are grouped into “other short-lived” elements. Calculations for used
LWR fuel with 50 MW-day/kg burnup.
Next, consider how to “peel back the onion,” to
reduce the amount and longevity of radiotoxicity.  The
first step is to remove the uranium and transuranic
elements (actinides); these can be fissioned to produce
energy.  Thus, proper use of technology can turn them
from waste liabilities into energy assets.  If the energy
content elements are indeed removed from waste, the 
waste is less radiotoxic than uranium ore in less than
1,000 years. Humans have experience with successful
engineering constructs with a time scale of a thousand
years.  Humans lack engineering experience for hundreds
of thousands of years.
In the first few decades, the radiotoxicity is 
dominated by cesium and strontium (cesium-137 and
strontium-90), which have about 30-yr half-lives.  Most
AFCI recycle strategies call for these elements to be
removed from the other fission products and managed
separately due to their high heat production as they decay. 
The radiotoxicity of the residual long-term waste falls
below uranium ore in less than 100 years.  Basically, 
separation of cesium and strontium divides the waste into
a short-term component (cesium-strontium) that may only
have to be managed for a few hundred years and a 
residual long-term component that has relatively low
long-term radiotoxicity.
Further separation of waste streams accomplishes
little.  Within one year after discharge from a nuclear
power plant, the most radiotoxic elements are the 
lanthanides, also called the “rare earths.” But, these have
decayed in the first few decades, before waste would be
emplaced in the repository. Two dominant long-lived
elements - technetium and iodine - are inherently
separated from other materials in the UREX+ process and
would be made into appropriate waste forms.
V. SITE INDEPENDENT HEAT GENERATION
Like radiotoxicity, heat generation rates are important
to almost any waste disposal concept.  Excessive heat can
lead to excessive temperatures because of the difficulty of
providing for heat removal for long time periods.  Only
natural methods such as heat conduction or convection
can be depended on for thousands of years.  This
subsection shows that the same basic pattern seen for
radiotoxicity – transuranics, cesium-strontium,
technetium-iodine, lanthanides, other – occurs for the heat
generation rate.
There is an obvious benchmark for radiotoxicity, the
radiotoxicity of natural uranium ore that starts the
process.  There is not such an obvious benchmark for heat
generation rate because the rate of heat removal depends
on how the waste disposal site is arranged and the heat
conductivity of surrounding material.
Figure 4 shows the heat generation for used fuel.  As 
with radiotoxicity, the most important material to remove
from used fuel are the actinides, followed by cesium-
strontium.  Figure 4 shows the heat generation rate after 
the energy content (uranium, transuranic) and high-heat 
elements (cesium-strontium) are removed from residual
waste. One could go further and remove the lanthanides,
technetium, and iodine, but figure 4 shows that the heat
generation rate would not be greatly reduced.
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Figure 4. Heat generation rate of used fuel, at 50 MW-day/kg-HM burnup.
VI. POTENTIAL REPOSITORY CONSTRAINTS
Radiotoxicity and heat generation rates are useful
metrics, but do not, by themselves, indicate the risk and 
cost of disposal of used nuclear fuel or residual wastes.
These require looking at specific proposals for waste
disposal in actual candidate sites.  No country yet has a 
repository in operation for used nuclear fuel, and
therefore there are no hard numbers for the risk and cost
of used fuel disposal.  The preceding discussion does
suggest that the sequence of removing material from
residual waste should be the energy content elements
(uranium and transuranics), cesium-strontium, and then
technetium-iodine. Here, the analysis goes deeper, from 
site independent to site dependent, to ensure that the
preceding site-independent analyses do not lead to
misleading conclusions.
The U.S. proposes to dispose of used fuel in a
geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Examination of some of the constraints on such disposal
helps look us deeper at how recycling can address waste
management challenges. It is stressed that Yucca
Mountain parameters are used only as a benchmark; the
principles and approaches are generic to geologic
repositories.
There are three potential constraints on geologic
repository capacity – statutory capacity limits, dose limits,
and space capacity limits. The two technical limits are 
described in the following subsections.
VI.A. Dose Limits
Regulations limit the hypothetical dose to the public
from postulated release of waste in future centuries and
millennia.  These dose limits are independent of the
amount of waste emplaced or the amount of electricity 
generated from the fuel that results in the waste.  For 
example, the currently proposed dose limits for the
proposed geologic repository are 15 mrem/yr from when
waste is emplaced in the repository to 10,000 years and
350 mrem/yr from 10,000 years to 1,000,000 years.  For
the 10,000-year limit, the estimated dose tends to peak at 
10,000 years, meaning that is the key time period for
assessment of compliance.  For the longer-term dose
limit, the dose generally peaks between 100,000 and 
1,000,000 years - increased time means more time for
waste to escape and migrate to the public but also more
time for radioactivity to decay.
Often, the hypothetical dose via ground water
exposure is a dominant contributor to estimated dose.  It 
depends on a host of factors and complex modeling of the
repository site and waste form behavior.  To see if the
conclusions on the importance of different elements is
significantly different than those based on radiotoxicity,
consider past calculations for the Yucca Mountain 
repository.[4]
Figure 5 shows the relative contribution to 
hypothetical peak dose at 10,000 years.  The fission
products technetium and iodine dominate, even though in
figure 3 their radiotoxicity is an order of magnitude lower
than the transuranics; this is because they are more
mobile.  Fortunately, the current calculations indicate
several orders of magnitude margin between the
calculated hypothetical dose and the dose limit.  Thus,
even if the long-lived fission products from substantially
more years of waste were emplaced in such a repository, 
the dose limit would likely still be met.  If future
calculations do show an issue, one approach would be to
assure that the durability (slower leaching) of the 
technetium and iodine waste forms was longer than UOX,
if the technetium and iodine were released from the waste
form slower than from UOX, the calculated dose would
decrease per unit of source term.  Another approach
would be to transmute these long-lived fission
products.[5]
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Figure 5. Contributions to hypothetical dose from waste
in an oxidizing environment at 10,000 years from
elements in 5-yr old LWR fuel. 
Figure 6 shows the relative contribution to 
hypothetical peak dose, which occurs about a half-million
years after discharge from the reactor. The actinides
(uranium plus the transuranic elements (Np, Pu, Am) and
their daughters comprise about 99% of the potential dose
at 500,000 years;1 next is technetium and iodine at about
1 To better understand figure 6, note that the single most
important isotope is Np237, which is a daughter of both
Pu241 and Am241.  Thus, the contribution to future
Np237 dose is reflected in three slices of figure 6, 
neptunium itself, the amount of plutonium that decays
into Np237, and the amount of americium that decays 
into Np237.  The relative contributions are graphed this
1%.  This is consistent with figure 3, which shows the
contribution of technetium (Tc) and iodine (I) to total
radiotoxicity between 10,000 and 1,000,000 years to be
about two orders of magnitude lower than the actinides.
Other long-lived fission product (FP) isotopes make an
even smaller contribution.  Thus, the site-specific
example and the site-independent analysis point in the
same direction: recycle the transuranics and uranium and 
ensure technetium and iodine hazards are properly
managed. The total dose commitment from the
transuranic elements comes to about 99%, so that removal
and recycle of these elements may reduce the potential
long-term dose from the repository by about a factor of
100.2 If future calculations show an increase in the
relative contribution from technetium and iodine, options
would be higher durability (slower leaching) waste forms
or transmutation.
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Figure 6. Contributions to hypothetical dose from waste
in an oxidizing environment at 500,000 years from
elements in 5-yr old LWR fuel. 
VI.B. Space Capacity Limits
Several factors are involved in estimating how much
waste can fit into the allowable space such as the mass of
waste, the volume of packaged waste, the tunnel wall 
temperature, and temperatures in the rock between 
tunnels. The peak tunnel wall temperature can occur
when the waste is emplaced or just after the repository is 
closed (and thus the tunnels are no longer being cooled by
ventilation) - both are within several decades of when
waste is discharged from the reactor.  The peak
temperature in the rock between tunnels can occur
way because it shows which elements have to be
separated before disposal.
2 There are non-linearities in the calculation of 
hypothetical dose from the repository.  Thus, reducing
the source term by two orders of magnitude may not
result in the same reduction in estimated dose.
centuries after waste is discharged from the reactor.  The
technical capacity can depend on the mass, volume, short-
term heat (decades), long-term heat (centuries), and long-
term hypothetical dose (millennia) of emplaced waste. 
VI.B.1. Unprocessed waste mass 
The unprocessed waste mass is determined by how
much mass in used fuel is removed and recovered for
future use. Uranium is about 94% of discharged fuel;
transuranics are about 1% (previous figure 4).  Thus, there
is potential to reduce the mass of waste by a factor of 20
if all of this 95% is recycled. 
VI.B.2. Packaged waste volume
The volume of waste is determined by the mass of 
material to be disposed times the concentration of waste
in the final waste form, adjusted to reflect the volume of
surrounding waste packing.  For example, one potential
waste form is borosilicate glass.  For each material to be 
put into such a waste form, there is a maximum
concentration that will dissolve into the glass, which
determines the maximum waste loading.  The glass is then
put into some sort of package. Work continues on
appropriate waste forms, waste loadings, and packaging
for specific waste streams and compositions.  For
example, which waste streams should be combined into a 
single waste form or kept separate.
Removal of uranium from the residual high-level
waste both recovers energy content and helps reduce the
mass and volume of residual high-level waste.  The high-
level waste volume is reduced by keeping long-lived
contaminants such as technetium and iodine out of
products (such as uranium and transuranic elements) and 
short-lived wastes (such as cesium-strontium) so that
those products and short-lived wastes can be consumed or
disposed in ways other than high-level waste.
VI.B.3. Waste heat generation
The heat generated by waste must be factored into the
selection and design of the waste form, waste packaging,
and waste site.  The temperature of wastes may increase
depending on the detailed design, yet waste forms and
packages must maintain their integrity and the 
performance of the waste site must not be compromised.
For a repository similar to the Yucca Mountain site, 
analyses have shown that the heat generated from the time
the repository is closed (ventilation stops) to about 1500
years is a metric that helps compare options.  Figure 7 
shows the contributors to this time-integrated “heat
commitment” from used LWR fuel to a repository.
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Figure 7. Heat to repository during key time period (50-
1500 yr) from elements in 5-yr old fuel.
Plutonium and americium (and their decay daughters)
comprise about 90% of the heat commitment; thus, to 
reduce the “heat commitment” by a factor of ten requires
removal of plutonium and americium (and their decay
daughters).3  The next most important heat generators are
cesium and strontium, bringing the total heat commitment
to about 99%, so that removal of the transuranics, cesium,
and strontium would reduce the heat commitment to the
repository by a factor of about 100.  Detailed calculations
validate this these general trends.[6]  And, this result is 
consistent with figure 4, which shows that in the decades
to centuries after discharge from a reactor, the highest
heat generators are the actinides (in this case virtually all
due to the transuranics rather than uranium), followed by
cesium and strontium.  The site-specific example here and 
the site-independent analysis point in the same direction:
recycle the transuranics and separately manage the heat
from cesium and strontium.
7. PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE AND
PHYSICAL SECURITY
3 Note that the single most important isotope is Am241.
Its contribution to heat in the time period from 50 to
1500 years is reflected in two slices in figure B-8, 
plutonium (which includes Pu241 that decays into
Am241) and americium (which includes Am241).  The
partition between plutonium and americium depends on
the age of the used fuel because of the decay of Pu241
(14.4-year halflife) into Am241.  With 5-year old fuel,
plutonium and its daughters (such as Am241) are about
three-quarters of the heat commitment; material that 
starts as americium and its daughters is about 15%.  As
the fuel ages, the plutonium fraction decreases and the
americium fraction increases.
Any program or project aimed at future nuclear
energy technologies must properly address the issue of 
“proliferation resistance” of the overall system in which 
the advanced technologies would be deployed.  Both
institutional measures (which are not considered here, but
have the potential to be the primary factor in reducing
proliferation risk)) and technological measures must be 
considered.  Technological measures to reduce
proliferation risk include those that will reduce the
attractiveness of materials and processes for weapons
purposes, i.e., increasing proliferation technical difficulty,
proliferation time and/or cost).  Also, the technical 
proliferation risk reduction measures include a variety of 
steps to increase the efficacy of international safeguards
such as safeguards by design and improved monitoring
approaches. The AFCI aims to develop a progressive fuel
cycle approach that will set a high standard of
proliferation resistance and nuclear security. To provide
a higher standard of proliferation resistance, AFCI 
technologies must reduce nuclear proliferation risk
relative to current nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as
plutonium separation technology (PUREX).  Attention
must be paid to proliferation resistance measures that
include proliferation technical difficulty (the inherent
technical difficulty, arising from the need for technical 
sophistication and materials handling capabilities, to 
overcome barriers to proliferation), fissile material type,
time and cost to overcome proliferation barriers, and
detection probability.[7]
The following figures show neutron emission, heat
generation, gamma emission, and the bare sphere critical
mass for potential recycle materials.  Except as noted
below, all compositions are for equilibrium recycle
composition (i.e. after many recycles) based on reactor 
physics calculations.[8,9,10,11]  Five years is assumed to
elapse between reactor discharge and recycled fuel
reinsertion into a reactor.
Figure 8 shows neutron emission, higher values
complicate weapon physics and may make detection of
the presence of transuranics easier (hence improving
proliferation resistance) but also increase fuel fabrication 
costs. For comparison, weapon-grade (WG-Pu) is shown,
assuming that WG-Pu has 93.5% Pu239 and 6.5% Pu240.
Weapon-grade uranium has even lower neutron emission
than WG-Pu and is not shown.  The figure shows that the 
neutron emission from first recycle transuranics (i.e.,
derived directly from UOX discharge) is about the same
whether the material is Pu, NpPu, or NpPuAm.  In those
three cases, the neutron emission increases only modestly
as the material evolves over many recycles toward 
equilibrium in a thermal reactor (either uranium based
mixed oxide fuel (MOX) or uranium-free inert matrix fuel 
(IMF)). However, if all TRU are recycled (including Cm,
Bk, Cf), the neutron emission is two orders of magnitude
higher than if Pu, NpPu, or NpPuAm.  If recycled strictly 
in thermal reactors, the neutron emission eventually
increases another two orders of magnitude.  If recycled in
only fast reactors, the neutron emission can evolve into
one order of magnitude higher (than UOX discharge) for
fast reactors with transuranic conversion ratio of 0.0 to a
slight reduction in neutron emission for TRU CR of 1.1.
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Figure 8. Neutron emission of several recycle options at
equilibrium (except UOX-discharge), starting with 50
MW-day/kg-HM burnup UOX with 5 years between
recycles.
Figure 9 shows the heat generation rate of recycled 
transuranics. The IAEA considers plutonium that is 80%
Pu238 to be not directly weapon usable because its heat 
generation rate is too high; thus the figure shows the heat
generation rate of 80% Pu238 and WG-Pu for
comparison.  Unlike neutron emision, recycle of Am 
incurs a heat generation increase (compare NpPuAm vs 
NpPu).  The penalty in moving from NpPuAm to all-TRU
is significant, but more modest than for neutron emission.
The underlying reason is that neutron emitters are
primarily the very high transuranic isotopes, whereas all 
of the transuranic isotopes emit heat (have significant
decay energy).  Thus, as the mix of isotopes shifts to 
higher transuranics in the all-TRU case, there is a
substantial increase in neutron emission. The reduction in
neutron and heat as the TRU CR increases is due (in part)
to dilution of shorter-lived isotopes by increased
production of long-lived Pu239.
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Figure 9. Heat generation rates of recycled materials at 
equilibrium (except UOX-discharge, WG-Pu, and
80%Pu239)
Figure 10 shows the gamma emission rate; higher
gamma emission irradiates would-be proliferators and
fuel fabricators.  For comparison, the figure includes WG-
Pu and UOX with fission products included.  The trends
are broadly the same as heat generation rates, although the 
there is generally less difference from first recycle (UOX
discharge) to equilibrium for gamma energy than for heat
generation. Note that the increase in either heat or 
gamma emission in progressing from Pu to NpPu to
NpPuAm to all-TRU is far more modest than the increase
in neutron emission.
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Figure 10. Gamma energy emission of recycled materials
at equilibrium (except UOX-discharge, WG-Pu, and used
UOX fuel).
Figure 11 shows the bare sphere critical mass of
recycle options. With the exception of pure U235
included for comparison, all cases have no uranium.  The
calculations were done by the author using an estimator of 
bare sphere critical mass from E. Schneider.  All of the
recycle cases (Pu, NpPu, NpPuAm, and all-TRU) lie 
between the bare sphere critical mass values for pure
U235 and WG-Pu; there is little variation.
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Figure 11. Estimates of the bare sphere critical mass of
recycled materials at equilibrium (except UOX-discharge,
WG-Pu, and 100% U235)
If U238 is kept with any of the recycle compositions
shown in figure 11, the bare sphere critical mass will 
increase substantially (well over 100 kg-TRU), just as it 
does for downblending of U235 or WG-Pu.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Fuel cycle objectives must simultaneously address
waste management, proliferation resistance and nuclear
security, energy recovery, economics, and safety. This
paper only addresses certain topics; it ignores for example
the critical issues of the cost of doing different chemical
separations or making different types of fuels.
Disposition paths for all recycle and waste materials
must be included, addressing material forms, storage,
transportation, and reuse or disposal.  It is not sufficient to
only recover and recycle uranium and plutonium, as is
done with the separation technology PUREX that was 
developed over 50 years ago.
To improve physical security against threats from
sub-national groups, transuranics should be kept together
as much as practical.  This significantly reduces the
material attractiveness because of higher heat load, higher
gamma emission, and especially higher neutron emission.
Inclusion of uranium with recycled transuranics
increases the bare sphere critical mass meaning that more
material would have to be stolen to make a weapon and
then either the weapon would have to be larger, or the
uranium would have to be separated from the
transuranics.
Recycling for U.S. waste management could include
the following:
? Recovery and consumption of transuranic elements,
turning waste management liabilities into energy
assets.  This reduces waste heat generation and long-
term radiotoxicity and dose.
? Eventual reuse of uranium, when uranium ore prices
warrant.  This reduces waste mass, probably volume,
and long-term radiotoxicity and dose.
? Separate management of the heat from short-lived
cesium and strontium to simplify the design of
disposal facilities for the residual long-lived wastes.
? Careful attention to the residual hazards posed by
long-lived fission products (especially technetium
and iodine). As long-lived transuranic isotopes are
destroyed isotopes such as Tc-99 and I-129 become
dominant and constrain long-term environmental
benefits. It may be useful to put these isotopes in
especially low-leach-rate waste forms, geochemical
environments that inhibit their transport, or transmute
them.
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